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Collective Bargaining and Wage 
Equalization in Canada's 
Iron & Steel Industry, 1939-1964 
Bryan C. Williams 
This paper is one in a séries being prepared by the 
Labour-Management Section of the Fédéral Department of 
Labour's Economies and Research Branch. It has three pur-
poses. First, to highlight significant developments and cha-
racteristics in collective bargaining in the industry. Second, 
to détermine the extent to which wage equalization is présent 
in the industry. Third, to identify the influences that hâve 
contributed to thèse equalizing tendencies. 
Introduction and the Problem 
In 1948, Arthur M. Ross published his Trade Union Wage Policy 
and thereby initiated a surge of interest in the impact of collectively 
determined wages on traditional théories of wage détermination 1. Ross's 
re-examination, and studies by scholars which followed in his footsteps, 
were prompted by the fact that cur-
rent wage theory provided poor or 
no answers to five significant ques-
tions which arose under collective 
wage détermination. 
WILLIAMS, B.C., Assistant Dean, 
Faculty of Business Administration 
and Commerce, University of Alberta, 
Edmonton. 
1
 Ross, Arthur M., Trade Union Wage Policy, Berkeley : University of Califor-
nia Press, 1948, 133 pp. 
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1. Why is the size of the wage adjustment often more crucial than 
the amount of the wage which résulte ? 
2. Why are wages rates not equalized in the local labour market ? 
In économie theory, the market is the locus of the single price, 
enforced by compétition among buyers and sellers. Under com-
pétitive conditions, no buyer will offer more and no seller will 
accept less. 
3. Why is it work stoppages frequently occur when the différence 
between the parties has been reduced to minute proportions? 
4. Why do many unions insist upon a uniform rate throughout their 
jurisdiction when économie theory suggests that a monopolist can 
maximize his income by discriminating among buyers ? 
5. Why is it unions often press for consolidated bargaining struc-
tures, as represented by multi-union and multi-employer bar-
gaining? 
Ail of the above questions are concerned with the relationship between 
one occupational wage rate and another, or between the terms of seulement 
of one wage bargain and another. Collectively, they focus attention on the 
character and function of two equalizing tendencies in wage détermination 
under collective bargaining (common wage increases and occupational 
wage rates). Unfortunately, économie theory does not provide for thèse 
equalizing tendencies. It would appear that traditional market forces hâve 
no compelling significance. 
The years following Ross's publication produced numerous reports 
by scholars who either attempted to measure the degree to which the 
equalizing tendencies were présent in an industry, or elaborated on ins-
titutional processes which brought thèse tendencies about. Unfortunately, 
and surprisingly, little significant work was done on measuring the degree 
to which the tendencies were présent in an industry. They are assumed to 
be présent to significant degrees in steel and autos. On the other hand, 
considérable effort has gone into identifying and describing the institutional 
processes that brought them about. In gênerai, investigations along this 
line hâve followed three approaches : 
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a) co-operation among employers 2 ; 
b) pattern bargaining3 ; and 
c) enlargement of the negotiating unit (e.g., company-wide bargain-
ing, industry-wide bargaining, and multi-employer bargaining 4 ) . 
2
 For examples : 
MCPHERSON, William H., « Co-operation among Auto Managements in Collective 
Bargaining », Proceedings, Industrial Relations Research Association, May 6-7, 1960, 
pp. 607-614 ; 
STIEBER, Jack, «Company Co-operation in Collective Bargaining in the Basic 
Steel Industry », Proceedings, Industrial Relations Research Association, May 6-7, 
1960, pp. 614-620 ; 
PIERSON, Frank C , « Co-operation Among Management in Collective Bargain-
ing», Proceedings, Industrial Relations Research Association, May 6-7, 1960, pp. 
621-628. 
3 For examples: 
LEVINSON, Harold M., « Pattern Bargaining by the United Automobile Workers », 
Proceedings, Industrial Relations Research Association, May 2-3, 1958, pp. 669-674 ; 
LEVINSON, Harold M., « Pattern Bargaining : A Case Study of the Automobile 
Workers », Quarterly Journal of Economies, Vol. LXXIV, No. 2, May i960, pp. 
296-317; 
LOCKS, Mitchell O., «The Influence of Pattern Bargaining on Manufacturing 
Wages in the Cleveland, Ohio, Labour Market, 1945-1950», The Review of Econ-
omies and Statistics, Vol. XXXVII, No. 1, February 1955, pp. 70-76. 
MAHER, John E., «The Wage Pattern in the United States, 1946-1957», Indus-
trial Labour Relations Review, Vol. 15, No. 1, October 1961, pp. 3-20 ; 
SELTZER, George, « Pattern Bargaining and the United Steelworkers », The 
Journal of Political Economy, August 1951, pp. 319-331 ; 
CARPENTER, Walter H. (Jr.) and Edward HANDLER, Small Business and Pattern 
Bargaining, Babson Park, Mass. : Babson Institute Press, 1961, 243 pp ; 
STIEBER, Jack, The Steel Industry Wage Structure, Cambridge : Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1959, 379 pp. ; 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR, Collective Bargaining in the Basic Steel Industry, 
Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961, 317 pp. 
4 For examples: 
TILOVE, Robert, Collective Bargaining in the Steel Industry, Philadelphia : Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Press, 1948, 41 pp. (One of a séries entitled « Industry-wide 
Collective Bargaining Séries») ; 
BACKMAN, Jules and A. L. GITLOW, « Evolution of National Multi-employer 
Collective Bargaining », The Southern Economie Journal, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, October 
1951, pp. 206-218; 
CHAMBERLAIN, Neil W., «The Structure of Bargaining Units in the United 
States », Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 10, No. 1, October 1956, 
pp. 3-25 ; 
PETSHEK, Kirk R., « Research on Extent and Scope of Collective Bargaining », 
Proceedings, Industrial Relations Research Association, December 28-29, 1952, 
pp. 220-231. 
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It is generally believed that collective bargaining in Canada exhibits 
the same equalizing tendencies despite the fact that few attempts hâve 
been made to either confirm or deny their existence. As a resuit, such 
beliefs must be considered as little more than assumptions, or at best, 
unsupported conclusions. The primary question is : To what extent are 
the conclusions reached in thèse United States studies valid for collective 
bargaining in Canada? 
The Canadian iron and steel products industry was one of the in-
dustries selected for a multi-industry study of thèse equalizing tendencies 
in Canadian industries. It is an interesting case in that if thèse tendencies 
occur, they should be the resuit of co-operation among employers or 
pattern bargaining, probably the latter. Unlike the United States industry, 
Canada's industry has not experienced enlargement of the negotiating unit. 
Where it has occured it is limited to company-wide bargaining. Nearly ail 
bargaining in this industry is of a single plant/single local type. 
This paper is one in a séries being prepared by the Labour-Manage-
ment Section of the Fédéral Department of Labour's Economies and Re-
search Branch. It has three purposes. First, to highlight significant develop-
ments and characteristics in collective bargaining in the indutry. Second, 
to détermine the extent to which wage equalization is présent in the in-
dustry. Third, to identify the influences that hâve contributed to thèse 
equalizing tendencies. 
Developments and Characteristics in Collective Bargaining 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE CANADIAN PRIMARY IRON 
AND STEEL INDUSTRY — 1939-1946 
Compared to industries such as construction, transportation, textiles, 
wood products and mining, unionization and collective bargaining in the 
primary iron and steel industry are relative neweomers. Their late arrivai 
in large measure reflects the difficulties in organizing this industry. Many 
attempts were made but ail failed. However, when effective unionization 
and collective bargaining was first introduced to the industry in 1940, it 
spread very quickly. Within six years ail major producers were organized 
and operated under collective contracts. To a considérable degree, the 
acceptance and character of collective bargaining was the resuit of govern-
ment participation in the process during the critical war years 1939-1946. 
There were three prédominant features which characterized the de-
velopment of collective bargaining during this eight-year period. First, it 
was a period of aggressive unionization of a type which in method and 
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philosophy was in distinct contrast to the AFL groups which prior to 1939 
were active in this industry. Second, it was the record of attempts by a 
highly centralized trade union to impose on the Canadian industry its 
demands for a) a minimum basic labour rate throughout the industry, 
b) common rates for similar job classifications throughout the industry, 
and c) an industry-wide collective bargaining structure. Third, it was an 
example of how the union's drive to impose thèse demands on the in-
dustry was aided through the Fédéral Government's war labour policies 
in the areas of wage setting and dispute settlement 
DEVELOPMENTS TO 1940 
Collective bargaining in the Canadian steel industry dates from the 
Fall of 1940 when the ClO-inspired Steelworkers Organization Committee 
(SWOC) signed its agreement with the Dominion Steel and Coal Com-
pany (Dosco) at Sidney. The successful SWOC campaign was not the 
first effort to organize Canadian primary iron and steel. During the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, the Knights of Labour was active in 
Canadian steel communities and organized lodges in centres such as Ga-
nanoque, Brockville and Hamilton. When the Knights of Labour collapsed, 
it was succeeded by the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin 
Workers. It first entered Canada at Algoma's Sault Ste. Marie plant in 
1914. By 1919 it boasted 20 lodges in centres such as Sidney, Hamilton, 
Algoma, Montréal, Toronto, Belleville, London, Winnipeg and Vancouver. 
However, the postwar dépression and several unsuccessful strikes reversed 
its earlier organization successes and eventually led to the Association's 
total collopse. During the 1920's and the 1930's, union organization in 
Canadian steel was almost at a standstill. 
In the Fall of 1936, the newly formed Steelworkers Organizing Com-
mittee (SWOC) appointed Silby Barrett of the United Mine Workers to 
head SWOC's organizing drive in Canada. In December 1936, he suc-
ceeded in organizing the first local at Dosco's Sidney plant (Local 1064). 
In January of 1937, a second local was founded at the company's Trenton 
Works. Supported by a large and united membership and the newly passed 
Nova Scotia Trade Union Act, the union gained partial récognition by 
the Summer of 1937. It was not until 1940 that, with the help of a fa-
vourable Industrial Disputes Investigation Board report, it concluded an 
agreement. 
Organization at the Hamilton plant of Stelco commenced in the 
summer of 1937 and for some eight years met with only limited success. 
Organization of the third major producer, Algoma, commenced in the 
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winter of 1938 and brought the union greater immédiate succès than its 
Stelco efforts. For some time Algoma employées had operated an un-
affiliated association and were reluctant to accède to SWOC's invitation 
to join them. However, by 1940 most of the earlier résistance had been 
overcome and by a référendum vote the workers elected to join SWOC. 
The year 1940 found SWOC with one contract at DOSCO, strongly 
organized but without contract at Algoma, and very weakly organized at 
Stelco. However, the union's position soon changed and within two years 
it had not only tripled its 1940 membership of 15,000 but had also gained 
récognition and contracts from a large portion of employers in the in-
dustry 5. 
THE WARTIME PROGRAM 
The reasons for SWOC's rapid wartime successes are not hard to 
find. The war effort resulted in a sharp increase in steel labour demand 
and the Government's wartime policies and programs complemented the 
union's objectives of organization, récognition, and collective bargaining. 
In addition, leadership changes and concurrently increased financial aid 
from the International sparked new life into SWOC's Canadian program. 
By far the major highlight of the union's collective bargaining efforts 
during the war years was its incessant drive for an industry-wide basic 
labour rate of 55 cents an hour, common rates for similar job classifications, 
and an industry-wide collective bargaining structure (Dosco, Algoma, and 
Stelco). The initial step in a continuum of steps in this direction was taken 
by the newly formed union in the Fall of 1939 when it urged the calling 
of a joint government-employer-union conférence to discuss « matters 
of concern to the industry 6 ». According to a union report the fédéral 
Minister of Labour agreed to organize the conférence. Dosco, the only 
operator effectively organized, declined the invitation7. Shortly after-
ward, workers at Dosco, Sidney, voted to enforce their demands for a 
ôVi-cent wage increase in the basic labour rate of 43 Vi cents an hour, 
and 8-hour day and 48-hour week, and two weeks vacation after ten years 
of service8. The conciliation board appointed to look into the Dosco, 
5 For détails of developments to this time, see Harold A. LOGAN, Trade Unions 
in Canada, Toronto, The MacMillan Company, 1948, pp. 249-267. 
6 Steel Labour, Vol. IV, No. 12, December 29, 1939, p. 1. (Hereafter referred 
to as SL.) 
7 SL, Vol. V, No. 2, February 23, 1949, p. 1. 
8 SL, Vol. V, No. 4, April 26, 1940, p. 1. 
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Sidney, dispute took note of the philosphy emerging under the Govern-
ment's war wage policy and recommended the payment of a bonus tied 
to the cost of living, an annual contract, an effective 8-hour and 48-hour 
week, and a grievance procédure9. Under the agreement finally reached 
in September 1940, wages were increased 15 cents per shift and provision 
was made for a re-opening of wages should the cost of living rise more 
than 10 per cent10. 
While negotiations were under way at Dosco, the union launched an 
aggressive organization campaign at Algoma and Stelco11. At Algoma, 
workers decided in September 1940 to put the question of affiliation with 
SWOC to a référendum. In late October, workers voted to affiliate their 
Association with SWOC 12. In December after negotiations and a conci-
liation board report, Algoma signed its first agreement with SWOC. Wages 
were increased 2 cents an hour 13. At Stelco, organizing efforts had only 
limited success. The union was some years from its first contract with 
Stelco. 
The union's second effort at establishing industry-wide basic rates, 
common job rates, and industry-wide bargaining was launched at a con-
férence of delegates from Sidney, Trenton, Algoma, and Hamilton held 
in December 1941 14. Three resolutions adopted by this conférence are 
of importance. First, they décide to « . . . seek the establishment of na-
tionally standard wages, hours, and working conditions in the basic steel 
industry » and « . . . the establishment of a basic rate of at least 55 cents 
an hour in ail steel plants with upward adjustments and standardization 
of rates for ail semi-skilled and skilled occupations 15 ». In addition, the 
conférence set up a Central Negotiating Committee comprised of delegates 
from each of the four locals and instructed it to put the above proposais 
before the newly-established National War Labour Board (NWLB 16 ). 
9 SL, Vol. V, No. 7, July 26, 1940, p. 1. 
io Labour Gazette, Vol. 40, No. 10, October, 1940, p. 1004. (Hereafter referred 
to as LG.) 
H SL, Vol. V, No. 6, June 28, 1940, p. 1. 
12 SL, Vol. V, No. 9, September 27, 1940, p. 1 and Vol. V, No. 10, October 25, 
1940, p. 1. 
13 SL, Vol. V, No. 12, September 27, 1940, p. 1 ; LG, Vol. 40, No. 12, De-
cember, 1940, pp. 1236-1237 ; Vol. 41, No. 4, April, 1941, pp. 469-470. 
14 SL, Vol. VI, No. 12, December 19, 1941, p. 1. 
15 Ibid. 
16 For Wartime Wage Control Program to July 1943, see Wartime Orders-in-
Council Affecting Labour, Department of Labour, Ottawa, 1943. 
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Lastly, the Committee was also asked to attempt to establish « . . . wage 
standards for the various classifications of workers based on the highest 
rate in the industry or a comparable industry and that no local union 
bargaining committee sign a contract including a rate lower than the rate 
set as a standard for any classification before the Central Negotiating 
Committee has placed the matter before the War Labour Board ». 
The National War Labour Board turned down the application and 
argued that basic steel was a « régional » not a « national » industry. 
In addition, the Board was not prepared to classify further industries as 
national until it found out how the présent classification System worked 
out in practice. Following the Board's rejection, SWOC again called for 
a national conférence to discuss jointly « basic steel problems ». Nothing 
seems to hâve corne of this proposai17. The union's third effort to 
institute its bargaining program was taken in March 1942. Faced by a 
rejection of their claims as a national industry, the Algoma and Dosco 
locals applied to the Ontario and Nova Scotia régional War Labour Boards 
respectively for increases in their basic labour rates from the présent 
50V6 cents and 52Vi cents an hour to 55 cents an hour in both com-
panies 18. The Nova Scotia Board denied the increase and the Ontario 
Board granted an equally unsatisfactory compromise 19. Upon hearing of 
the Board's décision, both locals voted to strike to enforce their demands 
and urged the fédéral Minister of Labour to intervene. Following a 
meeting of the union and the Minister, the Minister recommended that 
both disputes be referred to a three-member Royal Commission20. On 
December 28, 1942, the Commission^ majority report recommended 
against any wage increase and the 55-cent an hour basic wage rate. 
It also held that the question of the classification of basic steel as a 
national industry was beyond its terms of référence. The minority report, 
written by the union-appointed member, supported both union requests 21. 
Upon receipt of the Commission's findings on January 9, 1943, both 
locals proposed to take strike action. On January 12, employées at Dosco, 
Sidney, walked out. They were followed by Algoma employées on January 
17 SL, Vol. VII, No. 1, January 30, 1942, p. 1. 
18 SL, Vol. VII, No. 3, March 27, 1942, p. 1. 
19 SL, Vol. VII, No. 8, August 28, 1942, p. 1. 
20 SL, Vol. VII, No. 9, September 25, 1942, p. 1 ; LG, Vol. 42, No. 10, October 
1942, pp. 1123-1124. 
21 For a complète review and the text of the reports, see LG, Vol. 43, No. 1, 
January 1943, pp. 53-68. 
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14. Later, Dosco employées at Trenton walked out in sympathy22. This 
move again prompted action by the Fédéral Government and on January 
18, at the request of the Prime Minister, a meeting of ail parties concerned 
was held in Ottawa. This meeting and subséquent meetings resulted in a 
« Mémorandum of Understanding > in which the Government agreed to 
recommend the following actions : 
1. That Dosco and Algoma be designated as national employers. 
2. That as a national industry a new case could be presented to National 
War Labour Board. 
3. That the case would be heard by the Board headed by a new chairman. 
4. That if the men returned to work, the Government would pass an 
order-in-council fixing 55 cents an hour as the minimum rate of 
eamings at Sidney and Algoma 23. 
Four days later, the Government issued Order-in-Council PC/689 
which authorized the Minister of Labour and the NWLB to implement 
the terms set forth in the Mémorandum of Understanding24. On March 31, 
1943, the NWLB handed down its décisions. It found against declaring 
the two companies as national employers on the grounds that under revised 
procédures nothing prevented appeals from régional décisions to the 
National Board. Wages at both plants were set at 50 cents an hour plus a 
9-cent an hour cost-of-living bonus effective March 23, 1943. It also 
stated that for the duration of the war, basic rates at the plants should 
not go below 55 cents an hour 25. 
The union was not completely satisfied with the Board's actions as 
it felt the terms of the Mémorandum had been somewhat watered down, 
particularly the 55-cent an hour basic wage rate. It was particularly 
disturbed over the décision not to class basic steel as a national industry 26. 
In July 1943, it went before the Board and requested restoration of 
differentials in effect before the increase of the basic labour rate to 50 
cents an hour and an increase in the basic labour rate to 55 cents an 
hour. The Board rejected the latter but granted increase of 6V2 cents an 
22 SL, Vol. VII, No. 1, January 22, 1943, p. 1. 
23 For a complète review, see LG, Vol. 42, No. 2, February 1943, pp. 191-
193 and SL, Vol. VIII, No. 2, February 26, 1943, p. 1. (Emphasis supplied. This 
«rate of eamings» was to cause subséquent problems.) 
24 ibid., p. 193. 
25 For text of décision, see LG. Vol. 43, No. 4, April 1943, pp. 439-444. 
26 SL, Vol. VIII, No. 4, April 23, 1943, p. 1 and Vol. VIII, No. 5, May 1943, 
pp. 8-11. 
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hour at Dosco's Sidney plant and AV2 cents an hour at Algoma to 
employées paid above the basic labour rate27. In October 1943, the 
Board approved rates at Trenton on a par with rates at Sidney28. The 
effect was to equalize rates in ail three mills. 
A later Order-in-Council PC-9384 incorporated the 9 cent an hour 
cost-of-living bonus into the basic labour rate raising the latter to 59 
cents an hour at Sidney, Trenton, and Algoma. In February 1944, the 
Stelco Association voted to join SWOC. Shortly after, the NWLB approved 
a Stelco request to raise the basic labour rate from 59 cents an hour to 
64 cents an hour29. In April 1944, the union, now the United Steelworkers 
of America (USA), renewed demands for the élimination of wage rate 
inequalities throughout the basic steel industry. Shortly after, the NWLB 
approved a request to raise the basic labour rate at Algoma to 64 cents 
an hour. Sidney and Trenton rates remained at 59 cents an hour30. 
After lengthy négociations and with the support of a favourable 
conciliation report, the union signed its first agreement with Stelco in 
April 1945 31. Ail three major producers were now under contact with 
the U.S.A. 
From July 1943, when the Board ordered wage equalization for 
maintenance classes at Sidney and Algoma, and later at Trenton, through 
to June 1944 the parties had not been able to agrée on the method of 
implementing the Board's décisions. As a resuit, a Mr. W. V. Ley was 
appointed by the Board to attempt to assist the parties in implementing 
the scheme. In April 1945, as a resuit of Mr. Ley's efforts and on his 
recommendations, the Board ordered that maintenance jobs at Sidney, 
Trenton, and Algoma should be paid the same for similar job classifica-
tions32. As a resuit, the basic labour rates and maintenance rates were 
uniform throughout the Dosco and Algoma complexes, except for the 
Dosco, Sidney and Trenton basic labour rates which were 5 cents an 
27 For terms of application, see SL, Vol. VIII, No. 7, July 30, 1943, p. 12. 
For Board award, see LG, Vol. 43, No. 10, October 1943, p. 1346. 
28 SL, Vol. VIII, No. 10, October 22, 1943, p. 1. 
29 SL, Vol. IX, No. 2, February 25, 1944, pp. 1-2. 
30 SL, Vol. IX, No. 4, April 1944, p. 9 and Vol. IX, No. 12, December 22, 
1944, p. 4. 
31 SL, Vol. X, No. 4, April 1945, p. 4 ; LG, Vol. 45, No. 1, January 1945, 
pp. 53-63 and Vol. 45, No. 4, April 1945, pp. 515-516. 
32 LG, Vol. 45, No. 4, April 1945, pp. 467-468 and Vol. 45, No. 6, June 
1945, pp. 822-823 (Algoma) and LG, Vol. 45, No. 6, June 1945, pp. 820-821 and 
Vol. 45, No. 7, July 1945, pp. 955-956 (Dosco). 
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hour below the Algoma/Stelco rate of 64 cents an hour33. This order 
brought to a close the third major effort of the union to establish a 
uniform basic labour rate and uniform job rates throughout the industry. 
In November 1945, the union again took the Sidney and Trenton basic 
labour rates to their régional boards34. Action on this request was not 
taken 'til late late 1946 and is part of the fourth effort of the union to 
develop its bargaining program. 
The union's fourth move started with a conférence of ail locals called 
in February 1946. Postwar demands were set at a basic labour rate m 
ail plants of 84 cents an hour and a 40-hour work week35. Subséquent 
negotiations with three producers made little headway and with the 
breakdown of negotiations in June, the locals proposed to take strike 
action on July 15. At Stelco, negotiations completely collapsed. At Algoma, 
the company insisted upon preferential treatment. At Dosco, the company 
pleaded inability to pay36. The stoppage was complète at Dosco and 
Algoma, but only partially complète at Stelco. On July 16, in the face 
of this strike action, and a growing government concern over postwar 
inflation, the Prime Minister appointed Mr. Justice Roach to conduct an 
inquiry into the three disputes. At the same time, the House of Gommons 
Industrial Relations Committee conducted a similar investigation37. As a 
resuit of this inquiry, the parties was urged to corne to Ottawa and 
negotiate with the union. As one union report noted : « Should the 
companies obey, industry-wide negotiations will hâve taken plac:e for the 
first time in the lifetime of Canada's steelworkers » 38. 
However, the companies did not obey and the union rejected the 
Fédéral Government's proposed terms of settlement39. The strike continued 
into early October40. The final settlement brought a wage increase of 
13Vi cents an hour while the union's demands for the 40-hour work week 
was dropped. Later, in November 1946 the NWLB granted the Sidney 
33 SL, Vol. X, No. 6, June 1945, p . 3. For U.S.A. reactions, see SL, Vol. X, 
No. 7, August 1945, pp. 2, 8, and 11. 
34 SL, Vol. X, No. 11, November 1945, p . 1. 
35 SL, Vol. XI, No. 3, March 1945, p. 1. 
36 SL, Vol. XI, No. 6, June 1946, p. 1 and LG, Vol. 46, No. 7, July 1946, 
pp. 915-916. 
37 SL, Vol. XI, No. 7, July 1946, p . 1 and LG, Vol. 46, No. 8, August 1946, 
p. 1087. 
38 SL, Vol. XI, No. 8, August 1946, p. 1. 
39 LG, Vol. 46, No. 9, September 1946, p. 1240. 
40 LG, Vol. 46, No. 10, October 1946, pp. 1436-1437 and Vol. 46, No. 11, 
November 1946, p. 1575. 
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and Trenton workers of Dosco the Algoma/Stelco basic labour rate of 
64 cents an hour. This award, together with the 13Vi cents an hour 
gained from strike action, brought uniform basic labour rates and main-
tenance trades rates at Dosco, Algoma and Stelco 41. 
By the winter of 1946, the U.S.A. had not only strongly organized 
the basic steel industry but also had corne a long way in reaching two of 
its wartime bargaining objectives — and industry-wide basic wage rate and 
uniform rates for similar job classifications. It had fallen considerably 
short of its third objective — an industry-wide bargaining structure. 
It is doubtful whether the U.S.A. could hâve come as far towards 
thèse objectives had its campaign not coincided with a wartime environ-
ment. Most certainly it would hâve been infinitely more difficult. In any 
case, wartime wage policies and procédures afforded the union two 
approaches whereby thèse objectives could be thrust on a most unwilling 
group of employers. First, had the union been able to hâve the industry 
classified as a national employer, it would hâve centralized wage setting 
in one agency, a procédure which tended to complément its bargaining 
objectives. Second, the ability of the union to call concurrent work 
stoppages meant that steel production, which was regulated on a « national > 
basis, could practicaUy be brought to a complète standstill. Paradoxically, 
while the Government's wage setting procédures were established on a 
« régional » basis, the Fédéral Government's dispute settling procédures 
(and most disputes were over wages) were operated on a « national » 
basis. As a resuit, the scope of dispute settling procédures and the terms 
of settlement such as the Royal Commissions, Ottawa Conférences, the 
investigations conducted by W. V. Ley, and Justice Roach, and the 
investigation of the Commons Industrial Relations Committee covered 
the industry as a whole. As a resuit, the dispute settling procédures com-
plemented the union's bargaining objectives even though the Government's 
formai wage setting procédure was « régional » and did not complément 
thèse objectives. It is interesting to note that most of the steps taken 
towards thèse objectives were the product of fédéral intervention preceding 
or during a work stoppage. 
Is Postwar Bargaining Présent in the Industry? 
POSTWAR BARGAINING IN CANADA'S BASIC STEEL INDUSTRY 
The removal of the Fédéral Government's wartime wage control 
procédures and the return of jurisdiction of dispute settlement from the 
41 LG, Vol. 47, No. 3, March 1947, p. 361. 
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fédéral to the provincial governments precipitated pronounced changes in 
the course of postwar bargaining in basic steel. As a corollary, and as 
would be expected, the further advance towards the union's three wartime 
bargaining goals was considerably diminished largely as a resuit of the 
shift in dispute seulement to local jurisdiction. An editorial in the union's 
paper Steel Labour amply stated the union's bargaining position at the 
end of the 1946 strike. 
« Three important principles were reaffirmed in the strike seulement. 
One, that the wages in Canada's basic steel are to remain standard. Two, 
that the industry must be treated as a single unit rather than as three 
separate units. . . . three, arbitrary rulings made independently of labour 
by government and employées are not going to be effective any longer. 
. . . only basic steel has the political as well as the économie effort neces-
sary to change government policy >.42 
During the war years, bargaining objectives of the union were centred 
in basic steel and were focussed on a narrow front-wage standardization 
and industry-wide bargaining. During the postwar years the union's 
objectives not only became centred on parts of the industry other than 
basic steel, but also became focussed on a much wider front. Basically 
stated, postwar objectives 1) reaffirmed the 1939-1946 basic steel policy, 
2) sought the « levelling up of fabricating rates to rates in basic steel », 
and 3) sought company-wide bargaining structures and agreements43. 
Thèse objectives are worthy of more detailed examination. In basic steel, 
the union had three major objectives : first, to hold onto its gains made 
during the war, particularly wage standardization and Consolidated bar-
gaining structures ; second, to further thèse objectives ; third, to place 
increased emphasis on non-direct wage items such as hours, pensions, union 
security, vacation, paid holidays, shift differentials, employée welfare, 
and job protection. 
The main device selected to attain the second objective was the use 
of a co-operative wage survey plan in each plant. This plan which provided 
for a joint labour-management job évaluation System, had been introduced 
in 1947 to the United States basic steel industry. A second device was 
the development of pattera bargaining in the industry. Under this approach, 
the newly negotiated terms of a contract formed the standard for ail 
contracts which were subsequently negotiated. 
42 Editorial, SL, Vol. XI, No. 11, November 1946, p. 5. 
43
 For détails, see : Summary of 1947 Wage Policy Conférence, SL, Vol. XII, 
No. 3, March 1947, p. 1. 
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In sections of the industry other than basic steel (usually referred to 
as the fabricating sections), the union pursued five major objectives : 
1 ) to extend its organization and collective bargaining to the fabricating 
sections of the industry ; 
2) the development of company-wide bargaining structures and agree-
ments under which substantially the same contract terms applied to 
each establishment in the company ; (The best example of this was 
the union's success with General Steel Wares and Dominion Bridge.) 
3) the development of company-wide bargaining structures and agree-
ments for basic steel producers, such as Dosco and Stelco, which also 
operated fabricating plants ; 
4) the « levelling up of fabricating job rates to the levels in basic steel » ; 
and 
5) the application of the co-operative wage survey plan and the basic 
steel settlement pattern to the fabricating sections of the industry. ** 
POSTWAR TRENDS IN BASIC STEEL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 45 
Attempts to Enlarge the Negotiating Units 
The union fully realized the implications of the return of dispute 
settlement procédures to provincial jurisdiction to its objective of industry-
wide bargaining. It took several steps in this direction during 1947, 1948 
and early 1949, but with the passage of the Industrial Relations Disputes 
Investigation Act in 1948 it seems to hâve realized the difficulties and 
efforts along this Une noticeably decreased. In its place rose demands for 
company-wide negotiations. 
In November 1947, National Director C. H. Millard called for a 
tripartite conférence « . . . to prevent dislocation in the industry when 
contracts corne up for renewal » 46. Nothing came of his appeal. During 
1947 and 1948, numerous appeals were made by the union to hâve its 
4 4
 Since this paper is concerned primarily with basic steel, thèse objectives in 
the fabricating sections will receive limited attention. 
45 The Negotiating Unit is a decision-making unit through which the private 
parties in an industrial relations System negotiate or bargain over changes in the 
substantive terms of their collective agreements. 
See : Alton W. CRAIG. « The Structure of Collective Bargaining in Canada ». 
Department of Labour. Economies and Research Branch. June 20, 1965. (Mimeo-
graphed), pp. 7-10. 
46 SL, Vol. XII, No. 12, December 1947, p . 1. 
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industry covered by the Industrial Relations Disputes Investigation Act47. 
One of the last efforts was made at the National Policy Conférence of 
February 1949 when it again urged the « Big Three » to meet with the 
union to work out a « . . . national formula for wages and contract 
changes » 48. Shortly after, the steel producers turned down the request 
on the grounds that such a scheme was quite unworkable because « . . . con-
ditions vary widely as between plants > 49. On a number of occasions the 
union asserted that Algoma and Dosco appeared interested in the idea 
but Stelco's adamant refusai scrapped the scheme50. 
Despite the complète failure of attempts to establish an industry-wide 
basic steel structure, attempts at establishing company-wide negotiating 
structures for producers also operating fabricating plants made considérable 
progress. One of the first moves along this Une was taken by Stelco locals 
in February 1947. At a meeting of représentatives from ail Stelco locals, 
it was agreed not only to présent common demands at negotiations but 
also to urge the development of a company-wide negotiating structure and 
a single master agreement. Plants represented included Hamilton Works, 
Ontario Works, Canada Works, Brantford Works, Swanswea Works, Gan-
nanoque Works and the company's two Montréal plants51. In 1948, thèse 
objectives were reaffirmed and a National Advisory Committee was estab-
lished to co-ordinate efforts52. 
Union efforts at establishing an industry-wide basic steel negotiating 
structure and company-wide negotiating structures met with only limited 
success. However, it must be realized that the union's purpose in developing 
thèse structures was to provide a basis for establishing uniform contract 
provisions throughout the industry. Since a change in the negotiating 
structure could not be implemented in the industry, the union pursued 
alternative methods which were designed to achieve the same ends — 
pattern bargaining and the co-operative wage survey plan (CWSP). 
Through pattern bargaining, the union has been able to reach its objective 
of uniformity in contract changes and through the CWSP it has been 
able to reach its objective of industry-wide uniform wage rates for 
similar jobs. 
47 For example, see : SL, Vol. XII, No. 7, July 1947, p . 1 and Vol. XIII, 
No. 8, August 1948, p. 3. 
48 SL, Vol. XIV, No. 3, March 1947, p . 1 and p. 11. 
49 SL, Vol. XIV, No. 4, April 1949, p . 1. 
5 0
 For example, see : Ibid. 
51 SL, Vol. XII, No. 3, March 1947, p . 12. 
52 SL, Vol. XIII, No. 1, December 1948, p . 1. 
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Pattern Bargaining 53 
One of the first trends évident in postwar negotiation was the 
establishment of pattern bargaining. This practice appears to hâve been 
first used in the 1948 negotiations54. The agreements negotiated at the 
three firms subséquent to the strike of 1946 ail expired on April 1, 1948. 
Negotiations to renew thèse agreements were started with Algoma in 
August 1947 and were followed by negotiations at Stelco and Dosco. 
Major demands in ail three cases were a weekly wage rate of $45 and a 
work week of 40 hours. Under the 1946 contract, the basic wage rate 
was IIV2 cents an hour and the work week was 48 hours. 
By February 1948, negotiations at Algoma and Dosco had totally 
collapsed and the parties had adopted an attitude of « wait and see that 
happens at Stelco » 55. In March 1948, Stelco reached an agreement and 
the terms of settlement were subsequêntly adopted in the Algoma and 
Dosco agreements. The basic labour rate was increased by HVi cents 
an hour to 94 cents an hour ($45.12 per week) and statutory paid holidays 
were increased from three to six. The work week remained at 48 hours. 
Algoma signed in April and Dosco signed in May 56. 
This 1948 agreement saw the establishment of the practice of 
« pattern bargaining » in Canada's basic steel industry. The technique has 
not only been consistently followed in subséquent negotiations but the 
union has repeatedly attempted, and with some success, to use the basic 
steel settlement as a pattern in other sections of the industry under the 
union's jurisdiction. In most cases, the union considered the Stelco settle-
53 Pattern bargaining is defined hère as the process whereby the substantive 
changes agreed upon in one negotiating unit subsequêntly become consciously in-
corporated into the substantive changes agreed on in other negotiating units. 
See : Alton W. CRAIG. « The Structure of Collective Bargaining in Canada ». 
Department of Labour. Economies and Research Branch. June 20, 1965. (Mimeo-
graphed), pp. 12-18. 
54 it may be argued that pattern bargaining was established during the war 
years. However, in the opinion of the writer, this was not so much pattern bargaining 
as industry-wide bargaining in that the industry was treated as a whole under the 
Fédéral Government's dispute settlement policies. Voluntary following of earlier 
contract settlement did not occur until after the war. Pattern bargaining offers 
management the alternative to freely follow or not to follow. This alternative was 
not available under fédéral dispute settlement policy. Wage controls were lifted on 
November 30, 1946. 
55 SL, Vol. XII, No. 5, May 1947, p. 1 and Vol. XII, No. 11, November 
1947, p. 1. 
56 SL, Vol. XIII, No. 5, April 1948, p. 1. 
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ment as the « key » or « leader » seulement57. However, this was not 
true in ail cases. 
Probably the best test of the union's ability to impose the pattern 
was exhibited in 1949 negotiations. In April 1949, Stelco had offered 
10 cents an hour, réduction in hours from 48 to 44, two more paid 
holidays (total of eight), and improved vacations. Dosco had offered six 
cents an hour across-the-board. Algoma rejected the union's insistence on 
the Stelco offer on the grounds of inability to pay and took negotiations 
to a conciliation board. Shortly after, the union accepted the Stelco offer 
and Dosco subsequently followed. At the conciliation board the union 
argued that the wartime-established wage uniformity should be protected. 
In post-conciliation negotiations, Algoma settled on the same terms as 
Stelco and Dosco58. The following review of settlements from 1950 to 
1964 illustrâtes the uniformity established in subséquent contracts59. 
1950 Negotiations : 
Leader — Stelco - wages increased 8 cents an hour across-the-board ; 
hours reduced to 40 ; basic labour rate $1.12 an hour ; wage reopener ; 
and two-year contract. 
Follower — Algoma-wages increased 8 cents an hour across-the-board ; 
hours reduced to 40 ; basic labour rate of $1.12 an hour ; wage 
reopener ; and two-year contract. 
Dosco-wages increased 2Vi cents an hour plus YlVi% July 1, 
1951 ; hours gradually reduced to 40 ; basic labour rate $1.06V& an 
hour ; and two-year contract. 
1951 Negotiations (wage reopener) : 
Algoma - wage increases ranging from 15 to 20 cents an hour ; basic 
labour rate $1.27 ; company accepts co-operative wage survey plan ; 
first application of plan to basic steel in Canada. 
Stelco-wages increased from 10 to 13 cents an hour ; basic labour 
rate $1.22 an hour. 
57 SL, Vol. XIII, No. 5, May 1948, p . 1 ; June 1948, p. 4, and LG. Vol. 48, 
No. 5, May 1948, p . 416. 
58 SL, Vol. XIV, No. 5, May 1949, p . 1. 
59 SL, Vol. XIV, No. 6, June 1949, p . 1 ; Vol. XIV, No. 8, August 1949, p. 3, 
and Vol. XIV, No. 9, September 1949, p. 1. 
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1952 Negotiations : 
Leader — Stelco - basic labour rate set at $1.43V£ an hour ; co-operative 
wage survey plan introduced ; 4 cents an hour incrément between job 
classes ; shift differential increased from 3-5 to 5-7 ; and wage 
reopener. 
Followers — Algoma - terms identical to Stelco. 
Dosco - labour rate set at $1.4016 an hour; 3 cents an hour 
effective in 1953 rather than wage reopener with guarantee that 
company will meet any increases granted by Stelco and Algoma ; 
rest of terms identical. 
1953 Negotiations (wage reopener): 
Stelco and Algoma grant 5 cents an hour across-the-board ; basic 
labour $1.48V£ an hour. 
1954 Negotiations : 
Dosco grants complète uniformity with Algoma and Stelco rates ; 
resuit of a 5-cent across-the-board increase plus rates worked out 
under the CWSP ; basic labour rate $1.48V6 an hour ; union claims 
that « . . . for the first time in the history of the United Steelworkers . . . 
the men in Canada's three basic steel plants will be paid the same 
rates for the same jobs ». ; two-year agreement. 
1955 Negotiations : 
Stelco settles for 7-20 cents an hour ; incrément increased to AV2 
cents ; basic labour rate $1.55Va ; shift differential from 5-7 to 6-8 ; 
Algoma settles on slightly différent terms : 5 cents an hour across-
the-board ; incrément from 4 to 5 ; and basic labour rate $1.53Va 
an hour. 
1956 Negotiations : 
Dosco settles first : 8 cents an hour across-the-board ; basic labour 
rate $1.56Vi an hour ; incrément from 4 to 5 ; and shift differential 
from 5-7 to 6-8. 
Stelco and Algoma settle on identical terms : 10 cents an hour in 
1956, 8 cents an hour in 1957 ; basic labour rates at Stelco $1.65Va 
and $1.73Vi an hour; at Algoma, $1.63Vi and $1.7116 an hour; 
Stelco incrément up to 5 and 5V6 and 5Vi and 6 at Algoma ; shift 
differential increased from 6-8 to 7-9 ; two-year agreement. 
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7957 Negotiations : 
Dosco wages increased 16 cents an hour ; basic labour rate $1.671/i 
an hour or 6 cents an hour below Stelco and Algoma ; incrément 
increased from 5 to 5Vi ; shift differential from 6-8 to 7-9 ; wages 
increased 7 cents an hour in 1958 plus any increase needed to hold 
Dosco/Stelco-Algoma differential at 6 cents an hour. 
1958 Negotiations : 
Leader — Algoma - wages increased 7 cents in 1958, 7 cents in 1959 and 
10 cents in 1960 ; welfare and vacation plans improved ; basic labour 
rate $1.95V6 an hour. 
Follower — Stelco -wages increased 5 cents in 1958 and incrément in-
creased from 5.5 to 5.6 ; 7 cents an hour in 1959 and incrément 
increased to 5.8, 10 cents in August 1960 and incrément increased 
to 6 cents ; basic labour rate $1.95Vi an hour in 1960. 
1959 Negotiations: 
Dosco-wages increased 5 cents in 1959, 10 cents in 1960, and 6 
cents in 1961 ; incrément increased from 5Vi to 6 cents in 1960 ; 
company again agrées to maintain 6 cents differential in Dosco-/ 
Stelco-Algoma rates. 
1961 Negotiations : 
Leader — Algoma-wages increased 4 cents in 1961, 5 cents in 1963 ; 
basic labour rate $2.05 in 1963 ; incrément increased from 6 to 
6Vi cents. 
Follower — Stelco-wages increased 4Vi cents in 1961, 5 cents in 1963 ; 
basic labour rate $2.05 an hour in 1963 ; incrément increased from 
6 to 6Vi cents. 
1963 Negotiations : 
Dosco - wages increased 4Vi cents in 1964 ; basic labour rate $2 an 
hour in 1964. 
1964 Negotiations : 
Leader — Stelco - wages increased 10 cents in August 1964, 5 cents in 
August 1965 ; incrément increased from 6.5 to 6.7 cents and shift 
differential from 7-9 to 9-11. 
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Follower — Algoma - setûes on terms identical to Stelco. 
As noted above, the terms of settlement with Algoma and Stelco 
hâve been practically identical since the 1949 negotiations60. In cases 
where there was slight déviation, such as in 1951 and 1955, such déviation 
was the resuit of attempts to equalize job rates between the two firms. 
As noted above, the 1954 negotiations had produced identical job rates in 
ail three plants. From 1949 to 1956, Dosco settled on almost identical 
terms as Stelco/Algoma. In the 1957 negotiations, Dosco appears to hâve 
broken out of the Stelco/Algoma pattern. It was in thèse negotiations 
that it was agreed that Dosco would maintain a 6-cent per hour differential 
below the Stelco/Algoma rates. This agreement was renewed in 1959. 
However, in 1961 negotiations this differential maintenance appears to 
hâve been broken as the differentials hâve widened considerably since 
that time. Presently, the basic labour rate at Dosco is $2 an hour compared 
with $2.20 an hour at Stelco/Algoma. 
60 Settlements extracted from SL : 
1950 : Vol. XV, No. 4, April 1950, p. 1 ; Vol. XV, No. 5, May 1950, p. 1 ; 
Vol. XV, No. 6, June 1950, p. 1 ; Vol. XV, No. 7, July 1950, p. 1 ; Vol. XV, No. 8, 
August 1950, p. 1, and Vol. XV, No. 10, October 1950, p. 1. 
1951 : Vol. XVI, No. 8, August 1951, p. 1 ; Vol. XVI, No. 8, August 1951, 
p. 11, and Vol. XVI, No. 10, October 1961, p. 1. 
1952 : Vol. XVII, No. 4, April 1952, p. 1 ; Vol. XVII, No. 7, July 1952, p. 1 ; 
Vol. XVII, No. 8, August 1952, p. 1 ; Vol. XVII, No. 9, September 1952, p. 1, 
and Vol. XVII, No. 11, November 1952, p. 1. 
1953 : Vol. XVIII, No. 6, June 1953, p. 1 ; Vol. XVIII, No. 8, August 1953, 
p. 3 ; Vol XIX, No. 2, February 1954, p. 1 ; Vol. XIX, No. 6, June 1954, p. 1 ; 
Vol. XIX, No. 8, August 1954, p. 1 ; Vol. XIX, No. 9, September 1954, p. 1, 
and Vol. XIX, No. 12, December 1954, p. 1. 
1954 : Vol. XX, No. 1, January 1955, p. 5. 
1955 : Vol. XX, No. 4, April 1955, p. 2 ; Vol. XX, No. 5, May 1955, p. 2 ; 
Vol. XX, No. 8, August 1955, p. 4, and Vol. XX, No. 9, September 1955, p. 4. 
1956 : Vol. XXI, No. 3, March 1956, p. 1 ; Vol. XXI, No. 7, July 1956, p. 1, 
and Vol. XXI, No. 9, September 1956, p. 1. 
1957 : Vol. XXII, No. 8, August 1957, p. 3. 
1958 : Vol. XXIII, No. 3, March 1958, p. 2 ; Vol. XXIII, No. 6, June 1958, 
pp. 8 and 9 ; Vol. XXIII, No. 10, October 1958, p. 1 ; Vol. XXIII, No. 11, No-
vember 1958, pp. 1 and 3, and Vol. XXIII, No. 12, December 1958, p. 2. 
1959: Vol. XXIV, No. 11, November 1959, p. 3. 
1961 : Vol. XXVI, No. 2, February 1961, p. 1 ; Vol. XXVI, No. 7, July 1961, 
p. 1 ; Vol. XXVI, No. 11, November 1961, p. 14; Vol. XXVII, No. 1, January 
1962, p. 1, and Vol. XXVII, No. 2, February 1962, p. 1. 
1963 : Vol. XXVIII, No. 9, September 1963, p. 1. 
1964 : Vol. XXIX, No. 9, September 1964, p. 1 ; Vol. XXX, No. 1, January 
1965, p. 1, and Vol. XXX, No. 3, March 1965, p. 3. 
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The Co-operative Wage Study Plan 
In the 1951 negotiations with Algoma, the union succeeded in 
introducing its Co-operative Wage Study Plan 61. This job évaluation plan 
had been developed in the United States basic steel industry beginning in 
1947. It had been developed jointly by industry and union officiais after 
the War Labour Board in 1944 had directed the industry to describe, 
classify, and group its jobs. The plan had enjoyed considérable? success 
from both points of view 62. In Canada the introduction of the plan differed 
in that it was not so much a case of jointly developing a plan as it was 
a case of jointly making the already developed plan work. The plan 
was introduced to Stelco and Dosco in the negotiations of 1952. As would 
be expected, this plan went a long way in equalizing job rates in ail three 
plants. As noted earlier, this union objective was realized in 1954 nego-
tiations. 
In each case the plan was worked out by a six-member committee, 
three from the union and three from management. At first, the plan was 
applied only to maintenance jobs. Later (1954), it was applied to ail job 
classes. The first step in applying the plan was the préparation of a job 
description. Once the description was accepted by both parties, it was 
fed into a job évaluation plan for évaluation. The évaluation plan used 
included ten factors grouped under three headings : skill factors, res-
ponsibility factors, and effort factors. Each of the ten factors was assigned 
a point value range with the responsibility factors receiving the highest 
maximum values. For each job the appropriate values for each factor 
was identified and the sum of thèse values represented the classification 
value of the job. The jobs were then grouped into 30 job classes with Job 
Class 1 being the basic labour classification. The wage rate assigned each 
classification was determined by adding to the basic labour rate the 
incréments by which the classification exceeded the Class 1 rate. For 
example, with a basic labour rate of $1.40 an hour and an incrément of 
Wi cent, a Class 5 job would receive $1.46 an hour63. 
Subséquent negotiations concerning the CWSP focusses on deter-
mining the incrément between job classes. When first introduced, the 
61
 Contract provisions applying at each firm from 1948-1965 are given m 
Appendix A, Table 1. 
62 shy Vol. XVI, No. 10, October 1951, p. 1. 
63
 The introduction of this plan and its impact on the industry's wage structure 
was examinated in depth in Jack Steiber's, The Steel Industry Wage Structure - A 
Study of the Joint Union-Management Job Evaluation Program in the Basic Steel 
Industry. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1959, 380 p. 
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incréments were set at 4 cents an hour at ail three plants M. By 1964, 
the incrément had increased to 6.7 cents an hour at Stelco/Algoma and 
6 cents an hour at Dosco. 
The union's objective has always been to establish an incrément 
equal to that applied in the United States plants. As a resuit, the movement 
of the differential has not been uniform within the Canadian « Big Three » 
plants. The conséquences of this objective hâve also contributed to the 
slight déviations in across-the-board increases in instances where wage 
increases were taken in incrément adjustments rather than across-the-
board adjustments. It will be noted that under this plan a small différence 
in incréments can make a large différence in job rates. This diversity in 
movement will be noted below in Table 1. 
TABLE I 
Incréments Under Co-operative Wage Survey Plan —1952-1964 
FIRMS 
Year Algoma Stelco Dosco 










The foregoing review has attempted to highlight the signifîcant 
developments in collective bargaining in Canada's basic steel industry 
during 1939-1964. Unfortunately, time has not permitted an examination 
of the impact of the developments in basic steel on the other sections of 
Canada's iron and steel industry, particularly fabrication, structures, and 
bridges. However, a few generalizations hâve been noted. First, after 
World War II the union set out to raise the wage level of « non basic steel 
sections » up to the levels attained in basic steel. Second, in a few instances 
4 4 4 
5 4Y2 4 
5Vz 5 5 
6 SVi 5*6 
6 5.6 6 
6 5.8 6 
6 6 6 
6»/2 6Và 6 
6.7 6.7 6 
64 For détails on plan, see : LG, Vol. 52, No. 9, September 1952, p. 1166; or 
Steiber, op. cit. Chapter II. 
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(Dominion Bridge and General Steel Wares are examples) the union 
succeeded in using the seulement in basic steel as the pattern for settle-
ment in other sections of the industry. However, data discussed in Part III 
of this paper indicate that the basic steel seulement was seldom the pattern 
for settlement in other sections. Third, the co-operative wage survey plan 
was extended to « non-basic steel sections » of the industry, particularly 
steel fabricating firms. It was applied in ail fabricating plants of Stelco 
in 1952 65. 
Equalizing Tendencies 
Although it is generally held that wage equalization occurs in the 
Canadian iron and steel products industry, no attempts hâve been made 
to empirically détermine its existence or character. It could be that, since 
it is generally held to exist in the United States industry, it is assumed 
to exist in the Canadian industry also. 
As noted earlier, published studies give little indication as to how 
the wage equalizing tendency is to be identified or measured. In addition, 
it is not often clear just exactly what it is that is being equalized. Some 
studies mean by equalization « the tendency of occupational wage differ-
entials between plants in an industry to narrow ». In other cases, equal-
ization means « the tendency of negotiated wage increases to be the 
same among ail firms within the industry ». In this study it was decided 
to adopt the second définition if for no other reasons than it is the easiest 
to handle and reliable data are readily available. 
Any attempt to measure this equalizing tendency must find solutions 
to two major groups of problems. First, the problems associated with 
obtaining reliable detailed data on contract changes. Second, the problems 
associated with comparing changes in one contract with another. As a 
resuit of the second problem, examination of changes was limited to wage 
changes. The spécifie problem then was to détermine the extent to which 
negotiations in the industry produced common wage changes. The attempt 
to measure the tendency was conducted under the following concepts and 
définitions. 
Wage Increase Equalizing Tendency — A term used to describe the 
tendency of negotiated wage changes in an industry to « group » or 
« cluster » around a common wage increase. 
65
 When first introduced at Algoma in 1951, the incrément was set at 3Vi cents, 
but this was changed to 4 cents when it was introduced to Algoma and Dosco in 
the following years. 
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Measurement of Degree of Tendency — A wage increase equalizing ten-
dency exists when 40 per cent or more of the negotiating units in the 
industry or 40 per cent or more of the employées covered by contracts 
in an industry received the same wage increase in a given year. If from 
40-60 per cent of the negotiating units/employees receive the same wage 
increase, the tendency is said to be «weak». If from 61-80 per cent of 
the negotiating units/employees receive the same wage increase, the 
tendency is said to be « strong ». If from 80-100 per cent of the negotiat-
ing units/employees receive the same wage increase, the tendency is 
said to be «very strong». 
Wage Increase — Increase granted across-the-board, or équivalent. 
Canadîan lron and Steel Industry — This group of industries is one of 
several major industrial groupings used in the Standard Industrial Classi-
fication Manual. The 14 spécifie industries included are given in Table II. 
TABLE II 
Industries Included in « Iron and Steel Products Industry » 
1. Agricultural Implements 8. Machinery, Household, Office & Store 
2. Boiler & Plate Works 9. Machine Tools 
3. Bridge & Structural Steel Work 10. Machinery, N.E.C. 
4. Hardware, Tools & Cutlery 11. Primary Iron & Steel 
5. Heatings & Cooking Apparatus 12. Sheet-Metal Products 
6. Iron Castings 13. Wire & Wire Goods 
7. Machine Shops 14. Miscellaneous Iron & Steel 
Negotiating Unit — The decision-making unit through which the private 
parties in an industrial relations system negotiate or bargain over changes 
in the substantive terms of their collective agreements. The vast majority 
of negotiating units in this industry are of a single plant/single local 
type. 
Data were provided from two major sources. First, the Department of 
Labour's contract files on negotiating units employing 500 or more 
employées. Thèse files provided contracts for the period 1959-1964. 
Second, reports on contract settlements appearing in the United Steel-
workers' paper, Steel Labour (Canadian édition) and the Labour Gazette. 
Thèse reports cover the period 1948-1964. Results based on the contract 
file data are summarized in the following paragraphs. The data supplied 
from Steel Labour (Canadian édition) and Labour Gazette are still 
being processed. Results will be reported in a supplemental paper. 
Results Using Contract File Data — Examination of the contract files 
revealed that data on wage increases were available for 26 of the 
negotiating units in the industry during the period 1959-1964. Thèse 
negotiating units provided the sample upon which the analysis tendency 
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was drawn. Only negotiating units covering 500 or more employées were 
included in the sample. As a resuit, 9 of the 14 spécifie industries 
were not included in the sample. Characteristics of the sample are 
given in Table III. 
TABLE III 
Characteristics of Sample — Iron & Steel Products Group 










Primary Iron & Steel 7 49 19,640 29,203 
Agricultural Machinery 3 71 9,750 10,557 
Iron Castings 5 184 3,770 12,884 
Machinery, N.E.C. 5 373 4,050 16,128 
Sheet-Metal Products 6 490 7,170 15,694 
TOTAL 26 1,167 44,380 84,466 
In summary, the sample included 53 per cent of the production 
employées in the five industries represented in the sample and 30 per cent 
of the 146,086 production employées in the iron and steel products 
industry 66. Unionization of production employées is believed to be approxi-
mately 68 per cent for the industry group. As a resuit, the sample includes 
45 per cent of unionized production employées in the industry. 
The data on wage increases provided from the contracta in the 
sample, and the application of the measurement criteria noted above, 
produced the results which are summarized in Table IV. The conclusions 
drawn from the data are as follows : 
1. There is no firm évidence of wage increase equalization in the iron 
and steel industry as a whole when examined on a « negotiating 
unit» or «employées affected» basis. In no year did the per cent 
of employées or per cent of negotiating units under a common wage 
increase exceed 50 per cent. However, 
2. there is strong évidence of wage increase equalization within the basic 
steel section, although it is confined to Stelco (Hamilton and Mont-
réal), Algoma, and until recently, Dosco at Sydney. This equalization 
is the resuit of pattern bargaining. Although thèse firms accounted 
for only 57 per cent of the negotiating units, they employed over 71 
per cent of the employées in the sample. In only two years, did other 
negotiating units participate in the pattern. 
66 SL, Vol. XVII, No. 12, December 1952, p. 4. 
TABLE IV 
Extent of Wage Patterns in Canadian Iron & Steel Products Group, 1959 -1964 
Group or Section 
Pattern Employées Strength 
Year Pattern Wage Under of 
Increase Pattern Pattern 
No. of Firms 
In Not in 
Pattern Pattern 
Iron & Steel Products Group 
Primary Iron & Steel 
Agricultural Machinery 
1959 Yes 70 47.5% weak 11 15 
1960 Yes 100 43.0% weak 6 20 
1961 No 
1962 Yes 40 42.1% weak 6 20 
1963 Yes 50 49.2% weak 11 15 
1964 No 
1959 Yes 70 81.4% very strong 5 2 
1960 Yes 100 87.1% very strong 4 3 
1961 Yes 4V2 0 71.3% strong 3 4 
1962 Yes 40 71.2% strong 3 4 
1963 Yes 50 80.1% very strong 5 2 
1964 Yes 100 71.3% strong 3 4 
1959 No 
1960 No 
1961 Yes 60 86.7% very strong 2 1 
1962 Yes 60 77.9% strong 2 1 
1963 Yes 60 77.9% strong 2 1 
1964 No 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Extent of Wage Patterns in Canadian Iron & Steel Products Group, 1959-1964 
Group or Section 
Pattern Employées Strength 
Year Pattern Wage Under of 
Increase Pattern Pattern 
No. of Firms 




Sheet Métal Products 
1959 Yes 70 55.7% weak 
1960 Yes 40 55.7% weak 
1961 Yes 40 70.1% strong 
1962 No 
1963 No 
1964 Yes 70 55.7% weak 




1963 Yes 50 82.2% very strong 
1964 No 
1959 No 
1960 Yes 30 45.3% weak 
1961 Yes 70 49.8% weak 
1962 Yes 70 53.7% weak 
1963 Yes 30 41.4% weak 
1964 Yes 60 81.6% very strong 
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3. There is little évidence of wage increase equalization within the other 
four sections of the industry which fell under the scope of analysis. 
4. There is some évidence that the pattera settlement of the « Big Three » 
basic steel producers is used as the basis for settlements reached in 
« non-basic-steel » sections. This is particularly true where basic steel 
producers operate plants which had negotiating units in the other four 
sections. 
Table IV shows a strong and consistent tendency towards wage 
increase equalization in the basic steel section of the industry. In each 
year, at least 71 per cent of the employées in the sample received the 
same wage increases. 
Tendencies are évident, although much weaker and less consistent in 
sheet-metal products (five out of six years), iron castings (four out of 
six years), and iron and steel products group (four out of six years). There 
is little tendency and consistency in agricultural machinery (three out of 
six years), and machinery, n.e.c. (two out of six years). 
It should be noted that enlargement of the bargaining unit is not 
a characteristic of collective bargaining in this industry. As a resuit, what 
tendencies there are should be the resuit of either co-operation among 
employers or pattern bargaining. Evidence advanced earlier seems to 
support pattern bargaining. 
Wage increases received by each negotiating unit during 1958-65 are 
given in Table A, Appendix B. 
The main contributors to the strong and consistent tendency in the 
basic steel section were Stelco, Hamilton (9,000 employées), Stelco, Notre 
Dame (850 employées), and Algoma, Sault Ste. Marie (6,000 employées). 
The 7-cent and 10-cent patterns of 1959 and 1960 were initiated by the 
Stelco agreement of November 6, 1958. Similar wage increases were 
adopted in the Stelco, Notre Dame, agreement of January 5, 1959 and 
the Algoma agreement of October 17, 1959. The 4Vi-cent, 4-cent, and 
5-cent patterns of 1961, 1962 and 1963 were established by the Algoma 
agreement of December 1961. Stelco, Hamilton, followed on January 23, 
1962 and Stelco, Notre Dame, followed on February 2, 1962. The 1964 
and 1965 patterns of 10 cents and 5 cents were initiated by Stelco on 
January 6, 1965 and were followed by Stelco, Notre Dame, on January 
21, 1965 and Algoma on February 1, 1965. It would appear that thèse 
three negotiating units hâve adopted pattern bargaining on wage increases 
with the lead alternating between Stelco, Hamilton, and Algoma. Stelco, 
Hamilton, led in two of the three agreements signed between 1958 and 
1965. Algoma led in one agreement 
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The remaining four basic steel negotiating units do not appear to 
be consistent participants in the wage increase pattern. Dosco, Sydney, 
participated in one year (1960) ; Dosco, Montréal, participated in one 
year (1963) ; and Manitoba Rolling Mills participated in one year (1959). 
Elec.-Met. at Welland did not participate in any year. 
A complète record of wage increases in basic steel from 1958-1964, 
showing the amount of increase and the date increase was granted, is 
given in Table B, Appendix B. 
Some Major Conclusions 
1. Since 1939, the collective bargaining policies of the United Steel-
workers in the Canadian basic steel industry hâve been directed îowards 
the establishment of industry-wide contract uniformity - uniformity in 
basic labour rates, rate uniformity between similar jobs, and uniformity 
in other substantive issues such as hours of work, shift differentials, pen-
sions, union security, Sunday premiums, and a job classification System. 
2. Union efforts towards uniformity in basic steel were greatly 
assisted through the Fédéral Government's wartime wage control and 
dispute settlement procédures. While wartime wage control dictated that 
negotiations be carried out separately for each firm (a procédure; which 
did not complément the union's uniformity objectives), the wartime dis-
pute settlement procédures permitted negotiations to take place on an 
industry-wide basis (a procédure which did complément the union's 
uniformity objectives). 
3. By 1946, the union had reached its basic steel objective of a 
uniform basic labour rate and had made strides towards uniformity in 
other job classes. 
4. In postwar negotiations the union attempted to maintain the 
uniformity gained during the war years by applying pattern bargaining 
throughout the basic steel industry. This attempt met with considérable 
success. 
5. In 1952, the union was able to further its objective of rate 
uniformity between job classes in basic steel through the introduction of 
its co-operative wage study plan to the industry. In 1954, the union had 
reached its objectives of a uniform basic labour rate and rate uniformity 
between similar job classes. 
APPENDIX A — TABLE 1 




















































































































5/7 For first time 
5/7 rates same in 





7/9 ential set at 
6/8 60 an hour. 
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Year and Increase 
ta 
Section and Negotiating Unit 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1965 1964 2965 % 
(cents) Ci 
i 
Primary Iron and Steel 
2 
o 
Stelco, Hamilton S 7 10 4V2 4 5 10 5 1 Stelco, Notre Dame 5 7 10 4Y2 4 5 10 5 3 
Algoma, Sault Ste. Marie 7 7 10 4Vi 4 5 10 5 o 
Can. Tube, Montréal 5 IVi 3 4 2 5 4 6 EQUA
: 
Dosco, Sydney 5 10 6 nil nil 4Vi 
EQUA
: 
Manitoba Rolling, Selkirk 7 5 nil nil nil 8 6 r 
Elect.-Met., Welland 6 6 7 5 5 5 25 1 
Agricultural Machinery 
z 
Massey Ferguson 14 8 8 6 6 6 14 6 
International Harvester 5 6 6 4 5 4 
Cockshutt, Brantford 9 10 11 6 6 6 
Iron Castings 
Dominion Bridge 7 4 4 nil nil 7 6 
Canadian Bridge 4 4!^ 5 5 nil nil 
Canadian Steel Foundries 7 4 4 3 nil 7-13 
Fittings Ltd. 5 9 3 nil 6 5 8 
u> 
Crâne Ltd. 6 5 4 4 nil 12 6 
APPENDK B — TABLE A (Continued) 
Wage Increase Received by Each Negociating Unit, 1958-1965 
Year and Increase 





Canada Iron Foundnes 
John Inglis 
Stelco (Canada Plant) 5 
Sheet-Metal Products 
American Can Co. 8 
Continental Can Co. HVi 
Continental Can Co. (Montréal) 










































































Source : Contract Analysis Working Papers. 
APPENDIX B — TABLE B 
Record of Wage Increases Granted, 1958 -1964 
Primary Iron and Steel—>Sample Negotiating Units 












5 0 effective Aug. 1/58 
7 0 effective Aug. 1/59 
10 0 effective Aug. 1/60 
4V2 0 effective Aug. 1/61 
4 0 effective Aug. 1/62 
5 0 effective Aug. 1/63 
10 0 effective Aug. 1/64 
5 0 effective Aug. 1/65 
7 0 effective Aug. 1/58 
7 0 effective Aug. 1/59 
10 0 effective Aug. 1/60 
4V2 0 effective Aug. 1/61 
4 0 effective Aug. 1/62 
5 0 effective Aug. 1/63 
10 0 effective Aug. 1/64 
5 0 effective Aug. 1/65 
6 0 effective April 1/59 
6 0 effective April 1/60 
7 0 effective April 1/61 
5 0 effective April 1/62 
5 0 effective April 1/63 
5 0 effective April 1/64 
5 0 effective Aug. 2/59 
10 0 effective July 31/60 
6 0 effective July 30/61 
4V2 0 effective Aug. 2/64 
Agreement signed Nov. 6/58 for 
Aug. 1/58 to July 31/61 
Agreement signed Jan. 23/62 for 
Aug. 1/61 to July 31/64 
Agreement signed Jan. 6/65 for 
Aug. 1/64 to July 31/66 
Agreement signed Oct. 17/59 for 
Aug. 1/58 to July 31/61 
Agreement signed Dec. /61 for 
Aug. 1/61 to July 24/64 
Agreement signed Feb. 1/65 for 
Aug. 1/64 to July 31/66 
Agreement signed May 27/59 for 
April 1/59 to March 31/61 
Agreement signed June 25/62 for 
April 1/62 to March 31/65 
Agreement signed Sept. 12/59 for 
Aug. 1/59 to July 31/62 
Agreement signed July 27/63 for 
Aug. 1/62 to July 31/65 
APPENDLX B — TABLE B (Continuée!) 
Negotiaîing Unit Increases Date of Signing and Length 
Stelco, Notre Dame 
Can. Tube, Montréal 
Manitoba Rolling, Selkirk 
1. 5 0 effective Aug. 1/58 
7 0 effective Aug. 1/59 
10 0 effective Aug. 1/60 
2. 41/2 0 effective Aug. 1/61 
4 0 effective Aug. 1/62 







10 0 effective 
5 0 effective 
5 0 effective 
3Vi0 effective 












































8 0 effective May 17/64 
6 0 effective May 17/65 
Agreement signed Jan. 5/59 for 
Aug. 1/58 to July 31/61 
Same settlement as Stelco, 
Hamilton 
Agreement signed Feb. 2/62 for 
Aug. 1/61 to July 31/64 
Same settlement as Stelco, 
Hamilton 
Agreement signed Jan. 21/65 for 
Aug. 1/64 to July 31/66 
Agreement signed Sept. 28/58 for 
Aug. 6/58 to Aug. 6/60 
Agreement signed May 10/61 for 
Aug. 6/60 to Aug. 6/63 
Agreement signed April 15/64 for 
Aug. 6/63 to Aug. 6/66 
Agreement signed Dec. 8/59 for 
April 16/59 to April 15/60 
Agreement signed Nov. 25/60 for 
Nov. 25/60 to Nov. 24/62 
Agreement signed May 25/64 for 
May 17/64 to May 16/66 
Source : C on tract Analysis Working Paper s. 
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6. Throughout the postwar period, the union has considered the 
basic steel seulement as the « key > or « pattern » seulement for negot-
iations in the « non-basic steel section » of the industry. However, the 
extent to which the union has actually succeeded in extending this pattern 
to « non-basic steel sections » is quite limited. 
7. The record of bargaining in Canadian basic steel illustrâtes that 
a union has more than one method of reaching uniformity in contract 
terms. In basic steel, the alternative of enlarging the negotiating unit to 
industry-wide bargaining or company-wide bargaining met with limited 
success. On the other hand, the alternative of pattern bargaining met with 
considérable success. This conclusion is of particular importance in that 
it demonstrates that there are alternative methods a union may use to 
obtain uniformity of contract terms. 
8. While collective bargaining in Canadian basic steel is « frag-
mented » (Le., carried out on a one-establishment/one-local basis), there 
is considérable uniformity in negotiated settlements. As a resuit, those who 
claim there is little uniformity in contract settlements because collective 
bargaining in Canada is « fragmented » will find little support for their 
contention in Canada's basic steel industry. 
LA NÉGOCIATION COLLECTIVE DANS L'INDUSTRIE 
CANADIENNE DU FER ET DE L'ACIER : 1939-1964 
Dans sa publication de 1948, Trade Union Wage Policy, Arthur M. Ross 
attirait l'attention autour de l'impact des salaires définis par voie de négociation 
collective sur les théories traditionnelles de détermination des salaires *. La raison 
principale de cet intérêt provient de l'incapacité de la théorie actuelle à fournir des 
réponses satisfaisantes aux cinq questions suivantes. 
1. Comment se fait-il que l'importance du mouvement relatif des salaires soit 
plus cruciale que le salaire qui en résulte ? 
2. Pourquoi les taux de salaires ne sont-ils pas égalisés sur le marché local du 
travail ? 
3. Comment expliquer les fréquents arrêts de travail consécutifs à des différences 
mineures, pour ne pas dire ridicules entre les parties ? 
4. Pourquoi plusieurs syndicats insistent-ils sur l'uniformité du taux de salaire pour 
toute leur unité de juridiction lorsque la théorie économique suggère qu'en 
situation de monopole, il est possible de maximiser le revenu en faisant de la 
discrimination entre les acheteurs ? 
5. Pourquoi cet effort par les syndicats de consolider leurs structures de négo-
ciation ? 
1
 Voir les références à l'original anglais. 
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Toutes ces questions reflètent les relations entre les taux de salaire occupa-
tionnels ou entre le résultat de deux différentes négociations de salaires. De façon 
plus globale, elles mettent en évidence le caractère et la fonction de deux tendances 
« égalisantes » dans la détermination des salaires par négociation collective. Dans la 
théorie économique traditionnelle, il n'y a pas de réponse à ce problème. 
Il y a très peu d'études qui fournissent une réponse satisfaisante malgré tous 
les travaux qui ont été faits. Cependant, on a beaucoup plus insisté sur l'identifi-
cation et la description des processus institutionnels qui causent ces tendances 
« égalisantes ». De façon générale, trois approches sont utilisées : 
a) la coopération entre employeurs 2 ; 
b) la négociation-type 3 ; 
c) l'élargissement des unités de négociation4. 
lusqu'à quel point les conclusions présentées pour la situation américaine 
sont-elles valables pour la négociation collective canadienne ? 
L'industrie canadienne du fer et de l'acier fut l'une des industries considérées 
pour étude du cas canadien. Dans ce cas précis, l'existence de ces tendances 
« égalisantes » serait le résultat de négociations-type ou de la coopération entre 
employeurs ; probablement plus le premier facteur que le second. Contrairement au 
cas américain, l'industrie canadienne du fer et de l'acier n'a connu aucun élargis-
sement d'unité de négociation. Presque toute la négociation dans cette industrie est 
faite au niveau local. 
Quelques conclusions 
1. Depuis 1939, la politique de négociation collective des Métallos s'est dirigée 
vers l'établissement de conventions uniformes à travers l'industrie. 
2. Les efforts syndicaux dirigés vers l'uniformisation de l'industrie de l'acier ont 
été secondés par les contrôles de salaire du gouvernement fédéral durant la 
dernière guerre. 
3. En 1946, les syndicats atteignaient leur objectif d'uniformité des taux de 
salaire de base et étaient en voie de l'atteindre pour les autres classes d'emploi. 
4. La négociation-type d'après-guerre a contribué à conserver l'uniformité acquise 
durant le conflit mondial. 
5. L'effort d'extension de l'uniformité des taux de salaire par le « Coopérative Wage 
Study Plan» a échoué en 1952. Deux ans plus tard, on obtenait l'uniformité 
pour des classes similaires d'emploi. 
6. Le succès dans l'industrie de l'acier primaire a été le modèle syndical de 
négociation dans les secteurs de l'acier non-primaire. Cependant le succès fut 
très limité. 
7. L'échec relatif de la tentative d'étendre des unités de négociation dans les 
industries canadiennes de l'acier primaire et le succès marqué de la négociation-
type indiquent qu'il n'y a pas qu'une méthode dont un syndicat puisse se servir 
pour obtenir l'uniformité dans les conventions collectives. 
8. Dans le cas canadien, la négociation est fragmentée mais en même temps on 
retrouve une grande uniformité entre les différents accords. Il n'y a donc pas 
de preuve solide à la cause de ceux qui relient directement l'un à l'autre dans 
l'industrie canadienne de l'acier primaire. 
